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Confident Pluralism: Surviving and Thriving through
Deep Difference
John D. Inazu. Chicago, 2016. 176 pages.
INTRODUCTION
A long time ago-roughly between the 2014-2015 academic
year and the spring of 2016, when Donald Trump's presidential
candidacy monopolized the public conversational agenda-there
was a heated debate about whether our culture was experiencing
a reprise of the 1990s and its struggles over "political correct-
ness." The debate was kicked off by an article in New York maga-
zine, in which Jonathan Chait argued that recent campus contro-
versies "would not have shocked anybody familiar with the
campus scene from two decades earlier."1 Subsequent events,
such as protests at the University of Missouri and Yale, but-
tressed Chait's claim that political correctness was back.2
Both the old and new debates over political correctness were
roughly contemporaneous with another phenomenon, of which
the "PC debate" is a subcategory: the so-called culture wars. This
is the label given to heated arguments in the late 1980s and early
t Gordon Rosen Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. My thanks
to Rick Garnett and Marc DeGirolami for comments.
1 Jonathan Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say: How the Language Police Are Pervert-
ing Liberalism. (New York Magazine, Jan 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L5PK-K2WC.
2 See Jonathan Chait, Can We Start Taking Political Correctness Seriously Now?
(New York Magazine, Nov 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L7JD-WMCJ. For criti-
cisms of Chait's January 2015 piece and broader defenses of on- and off-campus activism
on these issues, see Jonathan Chait, Secret Confessions of the Anti-Anti-P.C. Movement
(New York Magazine, Jan 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8KNU-PJF5 (providing
links to many critical responses); John K. Wilson, The Myth of Political Correctness, 20
Years Later (Academe Blog, Feb 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DJJ3-TZZ2 (arguing
that the supposed threat of "political correctness" was a "myth," then and now); Roxane
Gay, Student Activism Is Serious Business (New Republic, Nov 11, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/QL9Q-8MFQ.
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1990s over hot-button social issues such as school prayer, abortion,
pornography, and so on, as well as the identity politics that roiled
campuses.3
Around the time the political correctness debate returned,
the broader culture wars heated up, particularly around religious
issues. With some prescience, Professor Douglas Laycock wrote in
2011 that, "[f]or the first time in nearly 300 years, important
forces in American society are questioning the free exercise of re-
ligion in principle-suggesting that free exercise of religion may
be a bad idea, or at least, a right to be minimized."4 He tied this
development to broader social and demographic developments
connected to the culture wars.5 Conversely, some religious groups
were making what political progressives saw as aggressive argu-
ments for legal autonomy or exemptions on such matters as
whether religious entities must comply with nondiscrimination
laws and whether commercial enterprises must subsidize em-
ployee insurance coverage for contraceptive services over the en-
terprises' owners' religious objections. The Supreme Court's 5-4
decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc,6 in the early summer
of 2014, both exemplified these conflicts and presaged new ones,
particularly with respect to LGBTQ rights.7
Just as the academy is said to be divided between "lumpers"
and "splitters,"8 so there are those who tend to see the world in
terms of new developments and those-call us "old folks" or, per-
haps more generously, "Ecclesiasticians"-who insist that those
developments are actually cyclical.9 Twenty years is a popular
3 See generally James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America (Basic Books 1991).
4 Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U Detroit
Mercy L Rev 407, 407 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
5 See id at 412-23.
6 134 S Ct 2751 (2014).
7 See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 Harv L Rev 154, 166-77 (2014);
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U Ill L Rev 839, 848-55.
8 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn L Rev 471, 479 (2004).
9 For examples of this perspective within constitutional law and theory, see Barry
Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 L & Contemp Probs 149, 149 (Summer
2004) ("Seen through the lens of history, it is apparent that arguments about the Constitution
have a way of coming around again."); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Consti-
tutional Theory, 99 Yale L J 1, 1 (1989) ("American constitutional theory has been cyclical,




number for cycle spotters.1 0 Maybe it is the sweet spot for the cy-
cling of ideas, permitting just the right combination of amnesia
and nostalgia. Or maybe it is just an artifact of the human pro-
pensity to spot patterns in random data."
Twenty years separate the political correctness controversy
of the 1990s from its recent resurgence. Roughly the same span
separates the culture wars of the late 1980s and early 1990s from
the more recent outbreak. Before that, there was another twenty-
year cycle dating back to the social, cultural, and political revolu-
tions of the late 1960s, which some accounts identify as the
launching point for the subsequent cycles.,,
There is a third twenty-year cycle, intimately connected to the
other two but less remarked upon: a cycle of interest in pluralism.
In this picture, pluralism serves as an alternative to the struggles
between the polarized camps of left and right, liberal and con-
servative, secular and religious, or however else the contending
sides are described.
"Pluralism" itself is a term susceptible of multiple under-
standings-and to one big distinction: between pluralism as
purely descriptive and pluralism as a good in itself. What is im-
portant is that adherents of pluralism were interested in actively
fostering pluralism. They saw smaller groups and institutions
within the nation as having a value of their own, rather than
wanting to set universal rules that would hand a final victory to
one side or the other in the culture wars.13 Rather than advocating
a single defining vision of justice for society as a whole-say, of
equality over liberty or liberty over equality-they were con-
cerned with "the reimagining of society as a bundle of smaller,
10 In the legal literature alone, it has been spotted in police corruption, see Harold
Baer Jr and Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview, 40 NY L Sch
L Rev 73, 73 (1995), abortion law, see Sara L. Walsh, Liquid Lives and Liquid Laws: The
Evolution of Abortion Law in Japan and the United States, 7 Intl Legal Persp 187, 189
(1995), and third-party politics, see Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-
Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 Harv J Legis 167, 169-71 (1991), among
other areas.
11 See Apophenia (Wikipedia), archived at http://perma.cc/97TG-ZAGR; Michael
Shermer, Patternicity: Finding Meaningful Patterns in Meaningless Noise (Scientific
American, Dec 1, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc[MJ4B-RDP3.
12 See, for example, Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: A History of
the Culture Wars 1-7 (Chicago 2015). Other accounts see the culture wars as extending
throughout American history. See generally, for example, Stephen Prothero, Why Liberals
Win the Culture Wars (Even When They Lose Elections): The Battles That Define America
from Jefferson's Heresies to Gay Marriage (HarperOne 2016).
13 See Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture 191-94 (Belknap 2011).
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more intensely bound communities." This positive's form of plu-
ralism "morphed through many different formulations and took
a multitude of names."16 Its adherents came from both camps,
"confound[ing] the simple divisions of the culture wars."17 For
this reason, pluralism was a "political wild card."18
The story of cyclical interest in pluralism is harder to tell as
a matter of neat twenty-year intervals, in part because it re-
sponds to and thus tends to lag behind the culture-war cycles.
Like the culture wars themselves, it has earlier antecedents,
which in turn were related to contemporary social develop-
ments.1 9 In the 1970s, the interest in pluralism and the structures
that foster it was described in terms of the importance of "medi-
ating structures," a label popularized by Professor Peter Berger
and Father Richard John Neuhaus.20 In the 1990s, it was more
likely to be put in terms of multiculturalism or communitarianism,
but sometimes it was phrased directly in terms of the importance
of an active and positive pluralism itself. An example of this is the
work of Professor William Galston, whose advocacy of "liberal plu-
ralism"21 achieved some rhetorical prominence and occasional pol-
icy endorsement in the Clinton administration, in which Galston
worked.22
Given the general inclination of Americans to divide along
partisan lines, this kind of pluralism has always been a minority
voice in public conversation. And as each cycle's campus or cul-
ture war ebbs and the culture seems to return to the "center" or
14 Id at 191.
15 I use "positive" in this Review in the colloquial sense of viewing something as a
good thing, not in the academic sense of a descriptive rather than a normative account.
16 Rodgers, Age of Fracture at 191 (cited in note 13).
17 Id at 181, 194-98.
18 Id at 191.
19 See Mark Bevir, A History of Modern Pluralism, in Mark Bevir, ed, Modern
Pluralism: Anglo-American Debates since 1880 1, 12-16 (Cambridge 2012).
20 See Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role
of Mediating Structures in Public Policy 1-8 (American Enterprise Institute 1977)
("[M]ediating structures are defined as those institutions standing between the individual
in his private life and the large institutions of public life.") (emphasis omitted).
21 See generally William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value
Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge 2002).
22 See William A. Galston, The View from the White House-Individual and Commu-
nity Empowerment, in Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People:
From State to Civil Society 58, 61 (AEI 2d ed 1996) (Michael Novak, ed). For a brief over-
view of pluralism's occasional and partial political implementation, see generally James
P. Pinkerton, Mediating Structures, 1977-1995, in Berger and Neuhaus, To Empower
People: From State to Civil Society 51 (cited in note 22).
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to a state of relative calm, interest in pluralism and its literature
tends to fade as well.23
And now? If the current debate involves sharp conflict of the
sort that characterized the earlier cycles of culture-war and PC
debates, might we expect the same hunger for alternatives to
emerge? Will more people become "eager to reengage with the
value of pluralism [ ] as a distinctive approach of its own,"24 in
contrast with those who seek a culture-war victory for either the
left or the right?
If a new literature of pluralism emerges in this culture-war
cycle, Professor John Inazu's Confident Pluralism: Surviving and
Thriving through Deep Difference is likely to be one of its key
texts. Inazu's book is blissfully short, clearly written, aimed at ed-
ucated general readers rather than academic specialists, and un-
derwritten by personal experiences that cross standard culture-war
lines.23 Confident Pluralism is necessary reading for anyone who
is frustrated by the belligerence and inflexibility of the current
discussion and looking for ways for different deeply held perspec-
tives and tightly knit communities to survive and thrive.
But is it enough? There is reason to doubt it. There is much
to admire in Inazu's book, not least the simple fact of its existence.
Although this Review takes a mostly critical perspective, that is
not a final judgment on the merits of Inazu's book or of an active,
"confident" pluralism. On a substantive level, however, pluralism
as a positive approach-as a good in itself, rather than a descrip-
tive fact or a "technical problem . . . to be managed"26-faces seri-
ous questions and difficulties.27 After providing a critical sum-
mary of the book in Part I, I argue in Part II that these questions
remain largely unanswered in Confident Pluralism because of
Inazu's strategic refusal to stake out a more distinctive and force-
ful theoretical position on pluralism itself.
Confident Pluralism faces problems of timing, as well; the
question of timing is the focus of Part III of the Review. Inazu's
book comes along at an awkward moment for two reasons. First,
the current culture-war cycle may have crested. Second, the
23 See Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument for Accommodation of
Religion, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1301, 1302-03 (2016).
24 Id at 1304.
25 See, for example, pp 26-28 (discussing his family's experience as Japanese American
internees during World War II).
26 Horwitz, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 1303 (cited in note 23) (emphasis added).
27 Given that I identify with "positive pluralism," any criticisms here are certainly
also self-criticisms.
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rise-and ultimately the electoral triumph-of Trump has inter-
rupted that cycle, in ways that disrupt and explode the standard
culture wars even more than they exemplify or exacerbate them.
For almost a year, and no doubt well into the foreseeable future,
cultural and political commentators have shifted their attention
abruptly from the usual divisions of left and right over cultural
issues to the more immediate issue of the election and its after-
math. Cultural groups themselves have been torn over where
they stand on the election and on establishment versus populist
politics. Inazu's book thus comes along at a moment when it is
simultaneously most needed and least likely to make new con-
verts to the pluralist cause.
That is cause for regret. There is value in a forceful, positive
pluralism, even if it remains a minority approach that cannot
stave off the cycles of culture wars. I hope Confident Pluralism is
one of the first examples of a new round of pluralist literature.2
Especially when our social, cultural, and political dialogue seems
so polarized and zero-sum, there is some value even in imperfect
alternatives to that dialogue. Still, I spend more of this Review
discussing the problems of positive pluralism than proselytizing
for it.
I. CONFIDENT PLURALISM DESCRIBED
Like a TED talk or self-help book, Confident Pluralism starts
with an account of symptoms, diagnoses a problem, and offers a
set of rules and principles, each with its own neat example, as
therapy. In this Part, I describe and critique the building blocks
28 Professor Jacob T. Levy's recent book, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom
(Oxford 2015), is another important foundation for a new round of pluralism literature.
Levy's book distinguishes between two strands of liberalism. "[R]ationalist" liberalism is
"committed to intellectual progress, universalism, and equality before a unified law, op-
posed to arbitrary and irrational distinctions and inequalities, and determined to disrupt
local tyrannies in religious and ethnic groups, closed associations, [and] families." Id at 2.
"[P]luralist" liberalism is "skeptical of the central state and friendly toward local, custom-
ary, voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and associations." Id. In Professor
Abner S. Greene's words, the latter form argues for "recognizing a plurality of norms re-
garding how best to live, especially considering the tenuous grounding the state has to
insist on its position at all times." Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil
Liberties: Is There a Middle Ground?, 9 Harv L & Pol Rev 161, 192-93 (2015). Levy's book
acknowledges the limits of both strands but makes clear his sympathies for the pluralist
strand, in part because of the relative neglect it has suffered in comparison to rationalist
liberalism. See Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom at 27-28 (cited in note 28).
Greene's own book is another helpful text. See generally Abner S. Greene, Against Obli-
gation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy (Harvard 2012).
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of that diagnosis, and of Professor Inazu's prescription: the "con-
stitutional commitments and civic practices" that are said to con-
stitute "confident pluralism" (p 8).
A. Diagnosing Deep Difference and Prescribing Confident
Pluralism
On a variety of important and fundamental issues, "Americans
are-and perhaps always have been-a deeply divided people"
(p 15). But they "share some agreement": they have in common a
"modest unity" concerning "many of the background practicalities
we need to live as a society" (p 15).
Right now, the differences seem to dominate. They are exac-
erbated by factors such as political polarization,29 cultural and
geographical sorting,30 online balkanization,31 and the tendency of
interest group fund-raising operations to heighten their members'
sense of emergency and outrage in order to encourage donations
and member loyalty.32 The result is sharp disagreement, even the
"demonization" of our adversaries.33
Inazu's prescription for this problem is "confident pluralism."
It is "a political solution to the practical problem of our deep dif-
ferences" (p 6). It draws on our "modest unity" in order to make
living with and within deep differences more manageable and less
fraught (p 15). If that sounds rather general, it is. This and the
next Part of the Review explore the questions that "confident plu-
ralism" answers and leaves unanswered. But its core terms, at
least, are defined by Inazu in clear language that I cannot im-
prove by paraphrase:
29 See Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz,
Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 Ann
Rev Polit Sci 83, 85-87 (2006) (summarizing recent empirical literature demonstrating
increased party polarization).
30 See generally Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded
America Is Tearing Us Apart (Houghton Mifflin 2008); Marc J. Dunkelman, The Vanish-
ing Neighbor: The Transformation of American Community (Norton 2014).
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide 79-
83 (Oxford 2009) (discussing the phenomenon of "cyberbalkanization").
32 See Martha Minow, Religious Exemptions, Stating Culture: Foreword to Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights, 88 S Cal L Rev 453, 454-55 (2015). See also
Jeffrey M. Berry and Sarah Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and
the New Incivility 3-5 (Oxford 2014) (describing liberal fund-raising efforts in the after-
math of Rush Limbaugh's controversial 2012 remarks about Georgetown Law student
Sandra Fluke).
33 Minow, 88 S Cal L Rev at 455 (cited in note 32) (describing conference remarks by
Professor Nan Hunter of Georgetown University).
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Confident pluralism takes both confidence and pluralism se-
riously. Confidence without pluralism misses the reality of
politics. It suppresses difference, sometimes violently. Plural-
ism without confidence misses the reality of people. It ignores
or trivializes our stark differences for the sake of feigned
agreement and false unity. Confident pluralism allows genu-
ine difference to coexist without suppressing or minimizing
our firmly held convictions. We can embrace pluralism pre-
cisely because we are confident in our own beliefs, and in the
groups and institutions that sustain them. (pp 6-7)
B. Constitutional Commitments and Requirements
How do we accomplish this? The answer involves a combina-
tion of "constitutional commitments and civic practices" (p 8). The
constitutional commitments begin with individual rights, espe-
cially the rights of speech, religion, assembly, and association,
which "remain an important part of the check against majoritar-
ian power and the ability of individuals to establish meaning
apart from government orthodoxy-an important part of our mod-
est unity" (p 26). And they extend quickly to two general prem-
ises: inclusion and dissent.
Inclusion, often at the core of our equal protection guaran-
tees, stresses "the common aspiration of extending to others basic
membership in the political community" (p 29). Dissent empha-
sizes not only the right to express unorthodox views, but the right
"to reject the norms established by the broader political commu-
nity within our own lives and voluntary groups" (p 30) (emphases
added). A confident political community must, within limits, al-
low "citizens and the groups that they form" to establish norms of
their own-norms that "may be illiberal or inegalitarian, or []
may ignore the civic practices of confident pluralism" (p 31).
Inazu acknowledges that "[n]egotiating and renegotiating"
the relationship between inclusion and dissent "strains our mod-
est unity," and thus introduces "a tragic dimension to our efforts
at peaceful coexistence" (p 33).34 Perhaps little more can be said
about this. But it does suggest deeper difficulties in actually
34 For discussion of tragedy and religious freedom issues, see generally Marc 0.
DeGirolami, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom (Harvard 2013). For further discussions of
tragedy and law, see generally Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the
Constitution (Oxford 2011); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton rev ed 2011).
See also Horwitz, 128 Harv L Rev at 166-84 (cited in note 7); Paul Horwitz, Book Review,
Permeable Sovereignty and Religious Liberty, 49 Tulsa L Rev 235, 238 & n 25 (2013).
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achieving confident pluralism despite our "modest unity" as a po-
litical community.
A series of "requirements" flow from our specific constitu-
tional commitments and the values of inclusion and dissent that
underwrite them. First comes the "voluntary groups require-
ment": "Government officials should not interfere with the mem-
bership, leadership, or internal practices of a voluntary group ab-
sent a clearly articulated and precisely defined compelling
interest" (p 48). Freedom of association doctrine, by "[s]hifting the
constitutional focus [of associational freedom] exclusively to
speech," has failed to fully encompass and protect the freedom of
voluntary groups (p 34). It treats association as essentially ex-
pressive in value, and associational freedom as an instrumental
means of allowing groups to speak to others (pp 34-36). This al-
lows courts to treat as nonexpressive, and thus unprotected by
associational freedom, groups that actually are expressive in their
conduct or self-presentation.3s More generally, it fails to appreci-
ate the formative, "soul-making"36 value of group membership it-
self, and its importance in constituting a fully free, rich, and di-
verse society.37
The "public forum requirement" holds that "[g]overnment
should honor its commitment to ensure public forums for the
voicing of dissent and discontent. Expressive restrictions in
these forums should only be justified by compelling government
interests. Private public forums that effectively supplant these
government-sponsored forums should in some cases be held to
similar standards" (pp 64-65). Inazu is less convincing in linking
public forum law to the present status and needs of pluralism, at
least until he turns to "private public forums," most notably
online spaces such as Facebook (pp 61-62). But here the gulf be-
tween his prescriptions and current law, and the difficulty of ap-
plying his proposed multifactor test to determine when these
spaces "should be constitutionally required to serve roles akin to
35 See pp 36-39 (providing the wonderful example of the Top Hatters Motorcycle Club).
36 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity 155-212 (Princeton 2005) (de-
fining and analyzing the idea of "soul making"). Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah focuses
on the soul-making function of the state, but voluntary and involuntary groups also play
a vital role in soul making. See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul:
Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 Minn L Rev 1841, 1849-50 (2001)
("[W]hile it is true that we speak and express ourselves through associations, we are also
spoken to and formed by them and by their expression.").
37 See George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Amy Gutmann, ed, Freedom of As-
sociation 35, 37 (Princeton 1998); Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions 220-23
(Harvard 2013).
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traditional public forums" (p 63), poses problems for him. Of
greatest interest, given current debates over religion and nondis-
crimination law, is his argument that courts have unduly expanded
the definition of "public accommodation" in laws like Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 196438 (pp 63-64).
Last, but not least controversial, is the "public funding re-
quirement": "When the government offers generally available re-
sources (financial and otherwise) to facilitate a diversity of view-
points and ideas, it should not limit those resources based on its
own orthodoxy" (p 79). As Inazu puts it: "Facilitating pluralism
means funding pluralism" (p 67) (emphasis added). Stating the
point more mildly: given that public forums involve government
expenditures, and given "the ubiquity of government dollars in
today's regulatory state" (p 67), it may be that a modern liberal-
democratic state that values pluralism at all, and does not simply
seek to stamp it out, inevitably funds pluralism.
If so, questions arise: Can it do so with deliberate partiality,
and in service of what values or criteria? When it purports to
make funding generally available, must it fund even discrimina-
tory or illiberal groups? What counts as "generally available,"
anyway? For that matter, what counts as "funding"? Direct or in-
direct subsidies, tax exemptions, or all of the above?
Here, too, a cross-cutting set of academic arguments and le-
gal rulings leaves room for uncertainty about the current state of
the law, the course it ought to take, or both. Against recent and
increasingly popular arguments that the government should be
allowed (or required) to refuse to fund or grant tax exemptions to
groups whose conduct violates certain modern liberal norms in
order to express governmental "nonendorsement" of those val-
ues,39 Inazu takes a more catholic position. Using the example of
governmental reluctance to grant tax-exempt status to a feminist
38 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 243, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000a et seq. For
recent discussion and debate, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Liber-
tarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 Stan L Rev 1205 (2014); Richard A.
Epstein, Public Accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of As-
sociation Counts as a Human Right, 66 Stan L Rev 1241 (2014).
39 See, for example, Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It
Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality 109-41 (Princeton
2012); Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The Asymmetry of Accommodation, 88 S Cal L
Rev 703, 714 (2015) (raising these arguments to illustrate a concern about the direction of
antidiscrimination law and religious accommodation doctrine). For a broader discussion,
see generally Austin Sarat, ed, Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States:
Accommodation and Its Limits (Cambridge 2012); Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorse-
ment, 98 Minn L Rev 648 (2013).
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and lesbian-positive magazine, Big Mama Rag, in the 1970s,
Inazu argues that the tax code, with its special treatment of a
wide range of charitable, educational, and religious entities,
should be treated as supporting a "pluralistic endeavor for an ex-
pansive range of groups" (pp 67-73). We should treat tax-exempt
status and generally available funding as a kind of public forum,
in which the government cannot pick and choose the recipients of
its largesse.
Inazu recognizes that his position faces what we might call
the "Bob Jones problem"40 (see pp 74-79). The government, in-
cluding the judiciary, confronted a host of racially discrimina-
tory private institutions in the wake of the enactment of the
modern civil rights laws and largely refused to exempt them
from those laws.41 Later, in Bob Jones University v United
States,42 the Supreme Court upheld the denial of tax-exempt
status to Bob Jones University, which at the time had a policy
forbidding interracial dating by students.43 Despite never having
been applied expansively, Bob Jones is seen as forming a crucial
(if obviously insufficient) part of the governmental response to in-
stitutionalized racism in the United States (p 76). There is no
straightforward principled way44 to limit its scope to that case
alone and not to, say, the denial of tax-exempt status for entities
that discriminate against LGBTQ individuals-a point on which
the Obama administration's solicitor general was suggestively
reticent during the oral argument in the same-sex marriage case,
Obergefell v Hodges.45
40 Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 Harv CR-CL L Rev 79, 120 (2009) (using this phrase in a slightly different
context).
41 The locus classicus is Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160 (1976).
42 461 US 574 (1983).
43 See id at 580-81, 605.
44 There are certainly practical and historical arguments for treating cases like Bob
Jones as unique. Central to those arguments is the idea that the history of racism in the
United States involves a deep connection between public law and the "private" institutions
and social conditions that entrenched racism. This intertwinement demanded responses
that encompassed both the private and public, the legal and social realms. See pp 76-77;
Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions at 233 (cited in note 37); Epstein, 66 Stan L Rev at
1254-61 (cited in note 38). These arguments are more powerful than their critics
acknowledge, but they provide no principled answer to arguments that other evils, such
as sexism, homophobia, or the mistreatment of animals, also involve interwoven systems
of public and private entrenchment and also require bold solutions.
45 135 S Ct 2584 (2015). When asked during the oral argument about the denial of
tax-exempt status to universities or colleges that oppose same-sex marriage, Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli replied, "[I]t's certainly going to be an issue." See Transcript of
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As Inazu writes, "the Bob Jones decision is in some circles
akin to a sacred text," and he is commendably forthright in ques-
tioning it (pp 75-77). Like other pluralists,46 he is inspired here
by the late Professor Robert Cover, who agonized over "the power
and practice of a government that rules by displacing, suppress-
ing, or exterminating values that run counter to its own."47 And
Inazu can draw on the words of a liberal icon and eloquent plu-
ralist, Justice William Brennan, who wrote that tax-exempt enti-
ties "contribute[ I] to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and
enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society."48 But times
change. Today, it is unlikely that Brennan's name or his pluralist
prose have the incantatory power they once did for liberals.
C. Civic Aspirations and Imperatives
Having set out the "constitutional commitments" of confident
pluralism, Inazu asks what it would mean to "pursue the civic
practices of confident pluralism in our own lives" (p 80). Here, he
again offers a mix of general "aspirations" and more specific "im-
peratives." The aspirations are familiar enough. In a social
world-especially the online world-in which people are caught
between unnecessarily dismissive and insulting speech and the
tendency to nestle within cocoons of the like-minded, our pursuit
of "dialogue and coexistence" must embody aspirations of "toler-
ance, humility, and patience" (pp 83-85).
This is especially true in our habits of speech and dialogue.
Inazu invokes "[c]onfident pluralism's speech imperative": the
command that we "take steps to soften our tone and move out of
our echo chambers" (p 102). Our speech toward others, and our
reaction to speech we dislike, should embody those aspirational
qualities of tolerance, humility, and patience. We may also ease
conflict if we seek actively to bridge our ideological and other
gaps. Hence the "common ground imperative," which urges us to
Oral Argument, Obergefell v Hodges, Docket No 14-556, *38 (US Apr 28, 2015) (available
on Westlaw at 2015 WL 1929996).
46 Including me. See Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions at 93, 182, 291 (cited in
note 37).
47 Martha Minow, Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in
Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat, eds, Narrative, Violence, and the Law:
The Essays of Robert Cover 1, 1-2 (Michigan 1995).
48 Walz v Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 US 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan




"bridge relational distance even when we cannot bridge ideologi-
cal distance" (pp 123-24).
These are somewhat shopworn recommendations. More inter-
esting, if underdeveloped,49 is .the "collective action imperative"
(p 115). The subject here is how to "think about tolerance, humil-
ity, and patience in the context of collective action[s]" such as "pro-
tests, boycotts, and strikes," in which consumer, worker, or citizen
power is mobilized in numbers to force change (p 105). Mozilla
Corporation and its Firefox browser were the subject of boycotts
when the company named as its CEO Brendan Eich, who had con-
tributed $1,000 to the campaign for California's Proposition 8,
which limited the legal definition of marriage to that between man
and woman (p 111). The company itself, and even Eich in his offi-
cial capacity, was not said to be unfriendly toward gays and lesbi-
ans (p 112). Was this just "marketplace forces at work, influenced
by the marketplace of ideas"?50 When the Dixie Chicks announced
to concertgoers that they were ashamed to come from the same
state as then-President George W. Bush, listeners attacked them,
and radio stations, eager to cater to these vocal consumers,
dropped the band from their playlists. Was this "reminiscent of the
McCarthy hearings from the 1950s that resulted in actors being
blacklisted in Hollywood or the Nazis burning books in 1930s-era
Germany"?51 If we have different reactions to each of these exam-
ples, why? When are such actions appropriate or inappropriate?
If the answer depends in part on "power imbalances" (p 107),
as Inazu suggests, how do we define the relevant powerful or pow-
erless group? Did the Eich case involve politically vulnerable
LGBTQ individuals-or wealthy, politically connected Silicon
Valley consumers and companies? When we think about contests
between religion and LGBTQ equality or women's contraceptive
rights, do we refer to an undifferentiated "powerful Christian ma-
jority,"2 or do we think more specifically about the smaller and
49 Seep 115 (conceding that the collective action imperative is "somewhat underspecified").
50 Leslie Gabel-Brett, In the Marketplace, Free Speech Has a Price (NY Times, Apr 5,
2014), online at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/04/the-weight-of-executives
-personal-beliefs/in-the-markeplace-free-speech-has-a-price (visited Mar 26, 2017) (Perma
archive unavailable).
51 Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It "McCarthyism"? When Is It Proper?,
93 Cal L Rev 1413, 1423 n 35 (2005) (quoting a 2003 article paraphrasing the views of
California Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer).
52 Zo6 Robinson, The Contraception Mandate and the Forgotten Constitutional Ques-
tion, 2014 Wis L Rev 749, 751.
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increasingly isolated number of Christians who adhere with un-
popular firmness to "traditionalist" positions?
Confident Pluralism is right to identify the complexity of col-
lective political action in the marketplace as a pressing current
question.53 But its conclusion-"When we engage in these forms
of collective action, we should bear in mind the civic aspirations
of tolerance, humility, and patience" (p 115)-is too general to be
helpful, even if it is right.
II. IS CONFIDENT PLURALISM POSSIBLE WITHOUT POSITIVE
PLURALISM?
Professor Inazu describes Confident Pluralism in pragmatic
terms, as "a political solution to the practical problem of our deep
differences" (p 6) (emphases added). In the footnotes, he cites a
number of classic pluralist texts, but insists that his book "does
not adopt a previously established theory" of pluralism (p 7 n 12).
Indeed, it seems fair to conclude that the book neither adopts nor
announces any theory of pluralism.54 Inazu's starting point ap-
pears to be less an argument for the value of pluralism as such,
and more an acknowledgment of what Professor John Rawls fa-
mously called the "fact of pluralism": the simple fact that we live
in a community with diverse individuals, groups, traditions, and
views, many of them strongly held and conflicting.55
There are good reasons to take such an approach. There is a
meliorating spirit and even an occasionally proselytizing tone to
Confident Pluralism. Inazu may nod to the possibility of tragedy,
but it is no accident that he concludes his book with the word
"hope" (p 133). You do not create a broad-based movement by
starting with a small tent: you start with minimally theorized
areas of agreement,56 such as the fact of pluralism or general as-
pirations like preserving unity despite deep differences.
53 For further discussion, see Horwitz, 128 Harv L Rev at 177-84 (cited in note 7)
(discussing changes in and around the culture of the marketplace, as it reflects and incor-
porates features of the culture wars).
54 See p 7 n 11 (noting confident pluralism's "agnosticism about the moral justifica-
tions for and moral critiques of the fact of pluralism," while citing the "normative value
of institutions" to distinguish it from what Inazu calls Professor John Rawls's own ag-
nosticism on these questions).
55 Pp 4-5 (emphasis added), quoting John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Con-
sensus, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud 1, 4 (1987).
56 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733,
1735-36 (1995) (recommending reliance on incompletely theorized agreements to
"produc[e] agreement amidst pluralism").
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One may wonder if this strategy really works here. As Professor
Larry Alexander has written, "We do not need theory for what we
agree about but for what we disagree about."57 Rather, "[i]t is []
the area where we disagree that cries for attention, and that area
requires theorizing."58 For Inazu's incompletely theorized confi-
dent pluralism to work, there must be substantial agreement
about something, and it must provide a sufficiently solid founda-
tion for readers to be persuaded that his aspirations, require-
ments, and imperatives are a good idea. Is there anything here
that is strong enough to carry that weight?
I rather doubt it. Inazu's "something" appears to be the de-
scriptive "fact of pluralism": the unavoidable truth that we live in
a nation with a variety of views, groups, and cultures (pp 4-5).
But is that a good thing, or merely an inconvenient one? If it is a
good thing, does it apply to a plurality of groups and views gener-
ally, or only to the "right" groups? And if we agree in general
terms that a diversity of views and cultures is a good thing,59 do
we agree on the right response to it?
As Professor Martin Marty has observed, the American re-
sponse to the fact of pluralism has hardly been consistently laud-
atory. He noted the headline of an article published in the 1950s
in The Christian Century, then an important voice of liberal
Protestantism: "Pluralism-National Menace."60 Such a re-
sponse, Marty noted, "fit in well with struggles at midcentury
over the character of American politics, ethnicity, and religious
life."61 Notwithstanding platitudes about building one out of
many, the beauty of American diversity, and suchlike, there have
always been varied responses-varied over time and varied at any
given time-to the fact of pluralism.
At present, for reasons related to the culture-war cycles noted
at the beginning of this Review, there is disagreement over
57 Larry Alexander, Book Review, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R.
Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 531, 534 (1997).
58 Id at 535.
59 See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U Pa J Const L 573, 578-79, 608 (2000) (noting
that "diversity" has "joined 'family values' and'good medical care' as something that everyone
is for, as demonstrated by the fact that it is becoming ever more difficult to find anyone
who is willing to say, in public, that institutional or social homogeneity is a positive good
and diversity a substantive harm," but noting that "those who raise the banner of 'diversity'
... argue bitterly about its meanings," and that "someone who doesn't share one's own
views about the concrete meaning of this good is often subject to dismissive contempt").
60 Martin E. Marty, Pluralisms, 612 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 14, 15 (2007).
61 Id.
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whether pluralism as such is a good thing and about how to ad-
dress the fact of pluralism. That is certainly true of religious plu-
ralism, in the courts and elsewhere. When the Supreme Court in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v Smith62 rejected a constitutional right to religious accommoda-
tion in favor of a rule of neutrality and general applicability, it
worried that the dangers of exemptions from general laws would
increase "in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious
beliefs."63 Religious pluralism was viewed as a potential threat to
a well-ordered society, and state power was seen as the proper
response. 64
At the time, Smith was assailed as "an affront [] to our
society's hard-won pluralism."65 But the broad coalition that
supported the congressional response to Smith, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,66 has collapsed.67 The kind of
vigorous support for religious pluralism that underwrites legisla-
tive or constitutional accommodations for religious groups as such
is in bad odor today.68 The odes to religious pluralism by Justice
Brennan that Inazu strategically deploys are out of fashion.69
62 494 US 872 (1990).
63 Id at 888-90.
64 See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Con-
stitutional Protection, 75 Ind L J 219, 251-52 (2000); Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words:
Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 138 (Princeton 1995) ("The [Smith]
decision was statist and majoritarian in a virulent form.").
65 Eric Alan Shumsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Postmortem of a
Failed Statute, 102 W Va L Rev 81, 85 (1999), quoting The Necessity of Religion: High
Court Says Religious Freedom Is a Luxury-Wrong, LA Times B6 (Apr 19, 1990), archived
at http://perma.cc/VK5B-JLB5.
66 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
67 See Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious
Freedom Restoration, 125 Yale L J F 416, 418 (2016).
68 See Horwitz, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 1310-11, 1315-17 (cited in note 23). The
Court did unanimously uphold a prisoner's statutory religious accommodation claim in
Holt v Hobbs, 135 S Ct 853 (2015), with the support of a broad range of amici. See id at
862, 866-67. I doubt that Holt says much about continued support for religious pluralism,
however. Rather, Holt may signify that something other than support for religious groups
as such, like the fact that the plaintiff was a prisoner and a member of a disfavored mi-
nority, is needed to make religious accommodations palatable today. See Marc 0.
DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 San Diego L Rev 105, 108 n 10 (2016) (noting
judicial support for "[s]tatutory claims for religious accommodation by isolated, socially
and politically powerless individuals," but observing that "the absence of conflict with any
significant secular political interests . . . in these cases renders it difficult to evaluate the
depth of the Court's commitment to religious accommodation").
69 Professor Perry Dane, a former law clerk to Brennan, writes more generally, "The
sort of pluralism I treasure might be yesterday's news." Perry Dane, Judaism, Pluralism,
and Constitutional Glare, 16 Rutgers J L & Religion 282, 292 (2015).
2017] Positive Pluralism Now 1015
Across a range of culture-war and other issues, "[o]ur nation is
increasingly beset with pluralism anxiety."70
We are still happy to offer general statements in favor of di-
versity or pluralism. But the mainstream of contemporary liber-
alism is more concerned with what Professor Richard Boyd calls
"the perils of pluralism."71 The "rationalist" strand of liberalism,
with its "commit[ment] to intellectual progress, universalism, and
equality before a unified law,"72 is dominant. Pluralism is viewed
partly as a fact, partly as a good thing-but largely as a problem
to be managed through the law.7s As a recent statement by a ma-
jority of the US Commission on Civil Rights suggests, 4 the temp-
tation to insist on the "logic of congruence"-the idea that "mor-
ally essential values should be enforced throughout a society,"
including private associations, and that through such measures
"cultural conflict about essential moral values should effectively
be suppressed"75-is ascendant in contemporary political liberal-
ism and progressivism.76 What chances are there for a broadly
70 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv L Rev 747, 747 (2011). .
71 Richard Boyd, Uncivil Society: The Perils of Pluralism and the Making of Modern
Liberalism 1 (Lexington 2004).
72 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom at 2 (cited in note 28).
73 For a similar conclusion, see Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations
and-and among-Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S Cal L
Rev 493, 498-99 (2015) (noting that when the current debate over religious accommoda-
tion is seen as one of "religious liberty vs. civil rights" instead of one of "religious freedom
and, and among, civil rights, . . . [t]his approach tends to produce a narrative in which
religious liberty claims and claimants are difficulties to be managed, obstacles to be nego-
tiated, or even enemies to be defeated") (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
74 See Martin R. Castro, Chairman of the US Commission on Civil Rights, Letter to
President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and Speaker of.the House Paul Ryan,
in Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling Nondiscrimination Principles with Civil Liberties (US
Commission on Civil Rights, Sept 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/BV4Y-PJSS.
75 Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 Chi Kent L Rev 485, 502 (2003), citing
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America
36-41 (Princeton 1998). See also Rosenblum, Membership and Morals at 36-38 (cited in
note 75) (describing the "logic of congruence" as insisting that "the internal life and orga-
nization of associations mirror liberal democratic principles and practices," including those
egalitarian principles and rules instantiated through generally applicable laws).
76 See Peaceful Coexistence at *29 (cited in note 74) (statement of Chairman Martin
R. Castro, US Commission on Civil Rights) ("The phrases 'religious liberty' and 'religious
freedom' will stand for nothing except hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for
discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, Christian su-
premacy or any form of intolerance."). See also id at *25 (noting the report's first finding:-
"Civil rights protections ensuring nondiscrimination, as embodied in the Constitution,
laws, and policies, are of preeminent importance in American jurisprudence"). Both of
these statements exemplify current progressive arguments and tropes in this area: (1) the
now-inevitable placement of scare quotes around the phrase "religious liberty," see pp 23-
24; and (2) the apparent position that nondiscrimination laws and policies should take
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stated but weakly rooted big-tent argument for confident plural-
ism in such an environment?
What is needed, I think, is a shift away from thinking about
pluralism as a fact to be managed-whether supportively, as in
Inazu's book, or in a more statist and equality-centered way, as
in the current position of many rationalist liberals-and toward
a view of pluralism as a positive value and a good in itself. I have
argued for this before.77 As before, I leave the shape of this argu-
ment underdeveloped here.
That is, perhaps, an admission of sorts. It is hard to develop
a positive, normative argument for pluralism as a good in itself.
And, like a religious liberty-protective or an egalitarian argu-
ment about culture-war issues, a positive argument for pluralism
must address not only the goods of pluralism, but also its inevita-
ble problems and conflicts. Moreover, like those who champion
"diversity" without acknowledging its multiple and contested def-
initions,78 the positive pluralist must define a particular brand of
pluralism, despite its multiple and contestable definitions. The
moment one defines it, or sets its limits, one begins to invite dis-
agreement and lose allies. One can sympathize with Inazu's deci-
sion to leave pluralism largely undefined and unjustified: to speak
in terms of general aspirations and principles, to emphasize the
need to work them out in individual cases, and to direct his advo-
cacy to a hypothetical reasonable reader, who will be able to apply
multiple factors and recognize sound limiting principles.79 It may
be that people who argue for pluralism as a good in itself are really
just arguing for a set of substantive positions and resolutions on
precedence over the Free Exercise Clause, or over religious freedom laws (like RFRA) or
policies. See Peaceful Coexistence at *108 (cited in note 74) (statement of Commissioner
Peter Kirsanow, US Commission on Civil Rights) (criticizing the report's first finding on
these bases). See also Marc 0. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91
Notre Dame L Rev 1465, 1507 (2016) (arguing that leading contemporary critics of a strong
pluralistic version of religious freedom treat "regulatory rights [and] statutory civil rights"
as "stand[ing] in a superior position of legitimacy and importance" to "rights with a textual
basis in the Constitution," like the Free Exercise Clause, and thus "shuffle[ ] the hierarchy
of rights and freedoms the better to suit [their] own preferences"); Garnett, 88 S Cal L Rev
at 497, 500, 509 (cited in note 73) (noting that religious freedom is itself a "civil right"
entitled to equal weight alongside other civil rights, including nondiscrimination rights).
77 See Horwitz, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 1302-05 (cited in note 23).
78 See Levinson, 2 U Pa J Const L at 578-79 (cited in note 59).
79 See p 63 (listing possible factors by which to judge private public forums); p 37
(asking, of the appeals court decision that the Top Hatters Motorcycle Club was a nonex-
pressive association, whether it "pass[ed] the test of common sense"); p 12 (asserting that
"I would like to think of myself as part of the reasonable middle," but acknowledging that
"what counts as 'the reasonable middle' is usually in the eye of the beholder").
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particular issues, and that in this they are in the same position
as those who argue more forcefully for liberty or equality, liberal-
ism or conservatism, one side of the culture wars or the other.80
I think this point is overstated. I believe there is something
to the possibility of arguing for pluralism as a distinctive positive
good rather than a mere "claim of descriptive sociology" to be
managed.81 There is a real difference between an approach that
treats equality (or liberty) as the good to be realized, leaving plu-
ralism to be slotted into or reconciled with that master value, and
an approach that starts with pluralism as a positive feature of our
society and treats liberty and equality as factors to be weighed
and considered as means of helping pluralism itself flourish. At
the least, it moves away from the "logic of congruence" and an
overly state-centered approach to our social and political struc-
ture. 82 And it demands suppleness about the different meanings
of "liberty" and "equality" themselves, and about the possibility
that the "official" legal versions of these values do not apply every-
where or with equal strength or meaning in different legal and non-
legal contexts.83
Such an approach demands that we treat the law's relation-
ship to religious and other groups, and to views that dissent or
depart from standard liberal-democratic norms, as "an 'existen-
tial encounter"' between two genuinely legitimate and equally
significant groups, "in which each side tries to make sense of and
decide whether or how to make room for the other."84 The answer
to that question is sometimes "badly" or "not at all." But the pos-
itive pluralist approach does not privilege one side of that encoun-
ter unduly, or assume that "making room for the other" should be
decided only by the state and only on the basis of "preeminent"
80 On this point, and on skepticism toward pluralism as a good in itself generally, I
am grateful to Professors Richard Garnett and Marc DeGirolami for discussions.
81 Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom at 27 (cited in note 28).
82 See Perry Dane, Master Metaphors and Double-Coding in the Encounters of Reli-
gion and State, 53 San Diego L Rev 53, 54-55 (2016) (noting that "legal pluralists of
various stripes [] refuse to assume that the state holds a monopoly on the phenomenon
of law and legal obligation").
83 See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in
Sarat, ed, Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States 194, 195-201 (cited
in note 39).
84 Dane, 53 San Diego L Rev at 55 (cited in note 82).
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liberal master values. There is room for this approach within lib-
eralism itself, although it may be a minority strain of liberalism.85
There is room for it outside liberalism.8e And there are pluralist
arguments and vocabularies that are not easily slotted into one
category or another.87
What is true is that this positive form of pluralism, and the
refusal to align oneself with the standard divides and oppositions
of the culture war, will probably remain in the minority, just as it
did in previous cycles when pluralism arose as a "third way" so-
lution to the culture wars. Neither liberals nor conservatives-
those who rely on the authority of the liberal state and its values
or those who appeal to religious authority and values-will nec-
essarily have any interest in adopting an alternative approach or
vocabulary. Both sides may see such an approach as subordinate
to some master value, or as illegitimate or incoherent. As I discuss
in the next Part, they may also reject positive pluralism for reasons
of timing: they may reject an approach that requires unnecessary
compromise or premature surrender in a war they believe they are
winning or are predestined to win.
III. IS IT Too LATE?
Perhaps I am selling Confident Pluralism-the book and the
idea-short. Professor Inazu's book is grounded in "a confidence
in the political arrangement that we call the United States of
America," and in the existence of "some basic level of agreement
about how to live with [our deep] differences" (pp 131-33). What
if he is right-and at just the right time to help save us? Again,
there is room for doubt.
85 See Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom at 2 (cited in note 28); Galston,
Liberal Pluralism at 39-47 (cited in note 21); Mark D. Rosen, Religious Institutions, Lib-
eral States, and the Political Architecture of Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U Ill L Rev 737,
768-73 (deriving an argument for "special protections" for religious institutions from
Rawls's original position behind the veil of ignorance).
86 For example, Professors John Gray and John Kekes both refer to "value plural-
ism," which differs from pluralism as such, and argue for its ultimate incompatibility with
liberalism. See John Gray, Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company, in Maria
Baghramian and Attracta Ingram, eds, Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity
85, 94-99 (Routledge 2000); John Gray, Isaiah Berlin 141-68 (Princeton 1996); John
Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism 199-203 (Princeton 1993). For a largely religious argu-
ment for "principled pluralism," see What Distinguishes the Center for Public Justice?
(Center for Public Justice), archived at http://perma.cc/9F9A-3LBE.
87 See, for example, William E. Connolly, Pluralism 3-7 (Duke 2005) (articulating a
positivist "multidimensional pluralism" based on a "bicameral orientation" toward politics
and contrasted with religious and cultural "unitarians").
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From an optimistic perspective, Confident Pluralism is per-
fectly timed, coming when the culture war is at its height and a
solution is all the more welcome. A more pessimistic reading of
our situation, however, is that the book is already too late. To be
effective, pluralist interventions in a culture-war cycle require a
very specific hospitable environment. The intervention must
come when there is enough heated disagreement to make an al-
ternative to the shouting seem attractive. But it must also occur
while both sides agree that there is a war, and think of either side
as having a serious chance of winning it, leaving them amenable
to compromise and coexistence. That is a pretty small window-
and it may already have closed.
This view appears in recent academic discussion as well as
more overtly political argument. Professor Andrew Hartman's re-
cent history of the culture wars-published in April 2015, before
the new cycle of campus controversy had reached its height with
protests at Yale, the University of Missouri, and elsewhere-con-
cludes confidently: "This book gives the culture wars a history-
because they are history. The logic of the culture wars has been
exhausted. The metaphor has run its course."88 (Now that is a
timing problem.) In a slightly different vein, Professor Stephen
Prothero argued recently not that the culture wars are over, but
that history shows that liberals almost always win them.89
Prothero does not view this as a reason for liberals to "press[]
for total victory in our culture wars."so But others disagree. They
think they have already won the culture wars, and that it is time
to consolidate their victory. At a minimum, there is no need for
political compromise.91 In a response to Inazu's books2 and a
striking prior post on the Balkinization blog,93 Professor Mark
88 Hartman, A War for the Soul of America at 285 (cited in note 12).
89 See generally Prothero, Why Liberals Win the Culture Wars (cited in note 12).
90 Id at 258.
91 See William L. Saunders, et al, Religious Liberty after Hobby Lobby: A Panel of the
2014 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, 48 Conn L Rev 969, 981-82 (2016)
(quoting Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson's discussion of a withdrawal of support by
LGBTQ, civil liberties, and civil rights groups for legislative compromises involving ex-
emptions from nondiscrimination laws following the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby).
92 See Mark Tushnet, Tolerance, Humility, Patience, and Asymmetric Accommoda-
tions (Balkinization, June 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8SCR-HV6F. It is amusing,
and characteristic of the culture wars, that Professor Steven Smith finds the current state
of accommodation asymmetric in the other direction. See Smith, 88 S Cal L Rev at 718-25
(cited in note 39).
93 See Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism
(Balkinization, May 6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8KNA-4FPW.
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Tushnet argues that "[t]he culture wars are over; they lost, we
won."94 The only remaining question is "how to deal with the los-
ers."91 The answer is that "taking a hard line ... is better than
trying to accommodate the losers."96 To the extent that Inazu's
confident pluralism is perceived (wrongly, I think) as a rearguard
measure, a way of securing some last measure of mercy from the
victors, it seems less likely than ever to find willing takers.97
Tushnet believes "taking a hard line [is] strategically the best
thing to do," but says he is "perfectly happy to have conversation
about whether there are better strategies."98 I think he is wrong,
descriptively, strategically, and normatively. Having already put
my pluralist cards on the table, I need not expound on the norma-
tive point. Descriptively, there is no doubt that there have been
significant and long-overdue changes in specific areas, such as the
general acceptance of the equal dignity and rights of the LGBTQ
community, at least on issues such as same-sex marriage, and no
doubt on many others.99 Not so long ago, even an ostensibly pro-
gressive president apparently felt compelled to take a more tradi-
tionalist public position on same-sex marriage, long after many
(myself included) had reached a contrary conclusion.100
But it is hardly clear that the culture wars end once a na-
tional majority reaches a consensus on some particular set of is-
sues. For one thing, we do not live in a country with an evenly or
randomly distributed population. It is increasingly sorted into
separate enclaves. In those enclaves, views may harden as well
as soften, and resistance may grow more rather than less fierce.O1
94 Id (emphasis omitted).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Tushnet, Asymmetric Accommodations (cited in note 92) (arguing that Inazu's
perceived focus on accommodation by "secular liberals" rather than religious conservatives
and others on that side of the line amounts to an asymmetric plea for liberals to be merciful
rather than for conservatives to face up to their defeat and advance compromises of their
own). See also Barton Swaim, The Left Won the Culture War. Will They Be Merciful? (Wash
Post, May 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8AW9-VFHQ (describing some recent con-
servative proposals for principled pluralism or pluralist subsidiarity as a post-defeat effort
"to remain who they are and to live as amiably and productively as they can in a culture
that doesn't look like them and doesn't belong to them").
98 Tushnet, Asymmetric Accommodations (cited in note 92).
99 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage (Pew Research Center, May 12, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/X2YJ-3SCE (showing a steady increase in the percentage of
US adults who favor same-sex marriage).
100 See Zeke J. Miller, Axelrod: Obama Misled Nation When He Opposed Gay Mar-
riage in 2008 (Time, Feb 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VQE3-G9N7.
101 See generally Bishop, The Big Sort (cited in note 30) (discussing geographical sort-
ing and its political and cultural effects); Dunkelman, The Vanishing Neighbor (cited in
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That phenomenon does not make confident pluralism any likelier.
But neither does it warrant confidence in a final victory in the
culture wars. Moreover, there is always another issue to start the
cycle going again. La lucha continua is a permanent social fact,
not just a slogan.
Strategically, Tushnet offers no evidence that a hard line will
win the peace or consolidate liberal gains. He does offer some his-
torical analogies, writing that "[t]rying to be nice to the losers
didn't work well after the Civil War, nor after Brown. (And taking
a hard line seemed to work reasonably well in Germany and Japan
after 1945.)"102 Historical analogies are always dangerous. Even
the ones Tushnet selects are dubious. There were compelling
moral reasons to take a hard line after the Civil War and the
Brown decision, but whether taking a harder line faster would
have worked better, or would instead have fomented even more
reaction, is a matter for historical analysis and conjecture. And it
is historically questionable to say that the Allies took a "hard line"
after World War II. The proposed Morgenthau Plan was a hard
line, but it was rejected, to the ultimate benefit of both Germany
and US-German relations.103 And much depends on whether
Tushnet has selected either the right examples or the only ones.
Did the harder-line Treaty of Versailles really "work reasonably
well"?io4 In eras of greater conservative public consensus, did
every conservative move and every conservative judicial decision
achieve a lasting gain and cow liberals into acquiescence?
I won't prolong that argument. Even if the culture wars are
not "over," it may still be true that Inazu's pluralist intervention
note 30) (arguing that shifts in the habits and routines of American "community" have left
Americans more isolated from incidental interactions with people of other classes or
views); Horwitz, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1301 (cited in note 23) (discussing the value of
accommodation in light of the threat that in its absence some groups will become more,
and more fervently, illiberal, even if other segments of that group become more main-
stream or liberalized in their views).
102 Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism (cited in note 93).
103 See Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction
of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945 108, 115-17, 124-25, 148-49 (Simon & Schuster 2002)
(describing Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's proposal to essentially turn Germany
into a giant demilitarized agricultural zone and its ultimate rejection by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in favor of reconstruction and aid).
104 For a condensed view of the Treaty of Versailles and its effect on interwar Germany,
see Colin Storer, A Short History of the Weimar Republic 114-40 (I.B. Tauris 2013) (ex-
plaining that attempts to evade and overturn the Treaty of Versailles dominated the
foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, and that the ultimate failure of "peaceful revi-
sion" of the situation contributed to the success of the Nazis by vindicating their more
aggressive tactics).
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has come too late, at least for the current cycle. There's always
the next cycle, of course. But for now, we may be past the point of
productive compromise on the issues that Inazu focuses on, or
past the point at which people are interested in finding "modest
unity" rather than accentuating their "deep differences." And to
this suggestion I would add one final, crucial data point-one that
seems to me to cut firmly against the idea that the culture wars
are over, without necessarily making it more likely that Inazu's
book will succeed at winning over new adherents to pluralism.
That data point is the same one that we started with: the short-
fingered data point whose swift political rise so rudely inter-
rupted our good old-fashioned on- and off-campus culture wars.
Its name, of course, is President Trump.
This Review was commenced in the fall of 2016, when we did
not know whether Trump would win or lose the election, and com-
pleted in December 2016, after his stunning victory and in the
middle of efforts to come to terms with and explain it. But even
before that victory, his rise itself was important. Few now doubt
that his rise and ultimate electoral triumph involved some kind
of meaningful-which is not to say correct or coherent-mass re-
sponse to the condition of our society and its economic and cul-
tural struggles. On this view, at least part of this phenomenon is
a distrust of elites, a dislike of political correctness, and a discom-
fort with what supporters see as the imposition on them of the
kind of enforced settlement of the culture wars that Tushnet's
posts seemed to advocate.105 They represent, at least in part, a
populist sentiment, mirrored in other ways by those to the left of
the mainstream Democratic Party, and directed against the very
establishment-generally well credentialed, affluent, and power-
ful-that Tushnet relies on to take a harder line.106
It's understandable that Tushnet's "hard line" post concludes,
"Of course all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes President.
But if he does, constitutional doctrine is going to be the least of
105 See 'No More Political Correctness'for Trump Supporters (PBS, Apr 10, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8EUP-AHS5; Conor Friedersdorf, A Dialogue with a 22-Year-Old
Donald Trump Supporter (The Atlantic, May 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/CJJ7
-YTRP; Ben Shapiro, From Victims to Victimizers: The Left's Long Journey (National Re-
view, Dec 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/R49L-VFL5 (arguing that, with "the Left
[having] already won the culture wars," it overreached, both by seeking to entrench and ex-
tend its victories and by having elites "judge red-state Americans as rubes [and] nasties,"
and that these "Americans reacted by telling the Left to shove it").
106 See John B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed
American and European Politics 62-87 (Columbia Global Reports 2016).
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our worries."107 Pithy, to be sure, and perhaps accurate. But those
lines were written in May 2016, when most elites still believed
the joke would soon be over and the race effectively decided in
favor of the "victorious" side in the culture wars. Trump's victory
suggests, contrary to Tushnet's treatment of this point as an after-
thought, that these two things-the urging of a liberal "hard line"
and the rise of an anti-elite conservative populist movement 0 --
are closely connected.109 That victory simultaneously disrupted
and entrenched the culture wars. It suggested that neither side
was interested in the kind of compromise and coexistence that
Inazu advocates, at least as long as victory was in prospect. And
now that the pre-election expectations of the elite culture warriors
have been upset in ways that might counsel compromise, there is
a good chance that both sides will either double downo or head
to the barricades on other and bigger issues rather than coming
together.
CONCLUSION
Although this is a critical review, Confident Pluralism is a
good and valuable book. Its aspirations, principles, and impera-
tives, to use Professor Inazu's terms, are all subject to question.
But they are reasonable, they do listen to both sides, and they
offer an attractive ethos with which to approach our cultural di-
vide, however much they leave open to an uncertain resolution.
107 Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism (cited in note 93).
108 The movement is led by a wealthy man, to be sure; but it is hardly unusual that
populist movements are led by individuals who are not themselves "of the people," but who
can spark a populist movement or recognize and exploit a populist moment. See Judis, The
Populist Explosion at 71-74 (cited in note 106).
109 See Nathaniel Peters, Stumbling toward a Compromise (Library of Law and
Liberty, Dec 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8HBW-3J8L (quoting a tweet by the
columnist Megan McArdle on the day after the election, which pointed to Tushnet's blog
post for those who "want to understand why evangelicals could vote for someone of
Trump's morals").
110 Unsurprisingly, Trump's victory has encouraged some conservatives to simply adopt
Tushnet's recommendation while reversing its terms. See, for example, Randy Barnett,
Abandoning Defensive Crouch Conservative Constitutionalism (Wash Post, Dec 12, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/G3PX-AXUN. As a libertarian, Professor Randy Barnett's own
recommendations do not track those of cultural conservatives, but I do not doubt that they
would agree with the tenor of his post, if not its specifics. See id ("Tushnet want[ed] the
courts to ram his side of the culture war down the throats of any recalcitrant Americans
he calls 'losers.' But the Trump victory represents a repudiation of Tushnet's claim that
the culture war has already been won by the Left. The 'losers' have struck back.").
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Most important, in my view, is the fact of Confident Pluralism.
Like other expressly pluralist interventions, it comes at a mo-
ment, during one of our recurring culture wars, in which debate
hardens around the poles and those poles move ever farther
apart. The culture-war cycles tend to subside. A few years after
the campus crises of the 1990s, everyone was focused on other
things. But they always come back. In or around each cycle, a plu-
ralist intervention also occurs, and these interventions have pro-
vided some of the richest and most inspiring literature, offering a
welcome alternative to the tedious trading of blows between left
and right, even if they have made relatively few converts.
In this cycle, too, I expect that voices and arguments like
Inazu's are destined to remain in the minority. Given that, I think
he would not have lost anything, and might have gained some-
thing, by forgoing the strategic benefits of incompletely theorized
agreement and putting forward a more particular and direct case
for a positive pluralism, one that is forthright about advocating
pluralism for its own sake, rather than as a kind of conflict-
resolution device.
But one voice is too small even to be called a minority. I hope
Inazu's will be one of many voices advocating pluralism. If it is,
we can expect plural variants of arguments for and definitions of
pluralism-some based on the "fact" of pluralism and others
based on the value of pluralism itself. I doubt highly that the cul-
ture wars are "over," or even that the current culture-war cycle is
over. In that sense, his book is all the more necessary and all the
more timely. That is one possible lesson of the rise and triumph
of President Trump.
Unfortunately, the other possibility is that Confident Pluralism
comes too late, or at least at the wrong time. Beyond the outcome
of the election, the fact that it happened this way may suggest
that between those who favor a hard line on one side and those
who favor populism and revanchism on the other, our differences
are too deep, our unity too modest, our interest in bridging the
gap too small, and the "reasonable" people in the middle who pop-
ulate the establishment too weakened by isolation and political
realignment to be of much help.
Those of us who find positive pluralism intellectually inter-
esting, or compelling in some deeper sense, or both, are thus likely
to remain a minority at best, affecting the debate around the
edges but not altering it much. Indeed, given the extraordinary
circumstances of the present moment, arguments for pluralism as
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a good in itself may be even less influential-and much more un-
welcome-at present than they usually are during culture-war
cycles. Not many populists are interested in having a conversa-
tion with elite establishment types about the modest unity that
lies at the heart of their deep differences, and vice versa. Nor is
either side interested in hearing that, rather than competing for
control of the state and the culture, they should be seeking the
proliferation of multiple sites of community, culture, and author-
ity, both liberal and illiberal.
Positive pluralists must be optimists of a sort, however. This
too will pass. Another cycle will emerge, another culture war will
erupt, and again we will argue for pluralism as a genuine and
distinct alternative. Like Gatsby, we will believe in the possibility
of something that "eluded us then" and probably will elude us
again.111 I see no alternative to this minority fate. That is true
whether the pluralism in question is the more positive and poten-
tially radical argument for pluralism as a good in itself or Inazu's
eminently reasonable confident pluralism, with its appeal to the
ostensibly shared values of a polity that may not exist. So be it.
Anyway, "that's no matter-tomorrow we will run faster, stretch
out our arms farther... . And one fine morning-"112
111 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 141 (Cambridge 1992) (Matthew J. Bruccoli, ed).
112 Id (ellipsis in original).
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